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COMMENTS
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND ITS APPLICATION
TO MILITARY PERSONNEL
HAROLD F. McNIECE* and JOHN V. THORNTON**
I. INTRODUCTION

The background and history of the Federal Tort Claims Act" are well
known. Stemming in part from the medieval political theory that the King
could do no wrong, a doctrine evolved in English law that the Crown was,
in the absence of its consent, immune to suit.2 This concept became a part of
the American common law, and in the main was enforced as rigorously on
this side of the Atlantic as in the mother country 2
The oft-times inequitable consequences of sovereign immunity in the
United States were at first sought to be ameliorated through the device of
private legislative enactments which appropriated monies for the relief of
persons injured by the negligence of Government servants. With the constant increase and diversification of Governmental activity and the concomitant inevitable rise in the volume of injuries inflicted upon -members of
the public by Governmental employees, the machinery of the private bill
*Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.

**Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law and Law Assistant,
New York Court of Appeals.

1. The statute was enacted on August 2, 1946, as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 STAT. 842-47; the provisions were embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§
921-46 (1946). By Act of June 25, 1948, Title 28 was revised, codified and re-enacted
in substantially its present form. It will be noted that §§ 2671 to 2680 comprise Chapter
171 of present Title 28 and are entitled "Tort Claims Procedure," whereas the other
sections pertaining to tort claims are interspersed in Title 28 in §§ 1291, 1346, 1402,
1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411 and 2412. Any tort claim against the United States under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1949) "may be prosecuted only in the judicial district where
the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1402(b) (1949). The general time limitation on suits for tort claims against the
Government is two years after the accrual of the claim, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (1949).
No jury trial may be had in such a suit, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2402 (1949).
2. An enactment similar to our tort claims statute was passed a few years ago
in England (Crown Proceedings Act., 1947, 10 & 11 GEo. 6, c. 44, § 2). For an excel-

lent comparison of the American and British practices, see Street, Tort Liability of
the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Crom; ProceedingsAct, 47 MIcH. L.
REV. 341 (1949). A history of the situation in this country prior to the Tort Claims
Act is found in Anderson, Tort and Implied Contract Liability of the Federal Governwent, 30 MrNN. L. Ray. 133 (1946); and in Hudson, The Federal Tort Claims Act,
22 TULANE L. REv. 299 (1947). A good synopsis of the judicial construction of the
statute is available in Note, The Courts and the Federal Tort Clahns Act, 98 U. oF
PA. L. Rxv. 884 (1950).

3. See, e.g., Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 57 Sup. Ct. 412, 81 L. Ed. 525 (1937);

Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 290, 13 L. Ed. 693 (1850) ; United States v. McLemore,

4 How. 286, 11 L. Ed. 977 (1846).
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system began to break down. At best such a system had been cumbersome
and unsatisfactory. Congress had no adequate investigatory facilities to
ascertain the facts in a particular case, and the compensating of a claimant
would often depend not on the merits of his cause but on the extent of the
political and personal pressure he was able to exert. Therefore in 1946 Congress, which had already waived the immunity of the United States in connection with contract claims, 4 extended the waiver to tort actions.
The general plan of the Tort Claims Act is to give to the district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of tort actions based on negligence claims against the
United States for property damage, personal injury or death caused by an
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be responsible; liability is to be determined in accordance with the law of the
place where the tortious act or omission occurredY Power is given to the
head of each federal agency or his designee to consider and dispose of any
claim for damages of $1,000 or less,8 and the Attorney General, with court
approval, may arbitrate, compromise or settle any claim after the com7
mencement of an action.
It is proposed here to consider only one aspect of the Tort Claims Act,
the phase relating to persons in the military service. Our concern is with the
circumstances under which claims may arise against the United States by
virtue of the activities of military personnel, and also with the situations
wherein such personnel may themselves assert causes of action against the
Government. The inquiry is, then, a two-fold one and embraces the activities
of servicemen as agential tortfeasors and as the victims of torts committed
by others in the government service.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The pertinent provisions of the Tort Claims Act relative to military personnel are as follows:
"... the district courts .

.

. shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions . . .

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or

4. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (1949).
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(2) (b) (1949).

Congress was so desirous of eliminating

the pestilence of private bills based on tort claims that it expressly provided that no
such bills should be received or considered in the Senate or House. 60 STAT. 831 (1946).
6. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2672 (1949). Prior to the passage of the Tort Claims Act the
Secretary of War or his designee was given power to settle claims arising out of the
noncombatant activities of the War Department and Army within the United States.
57 STAT. 705 (1943). A similar act pertained to the Navy. 40 STAT. 704 (1918). See,

Walker, Administrative Settlement of Claims Under the Federal Tort Clains Act, 9

Onio ST. L.J. 445, 454, 455 (1948), and Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 ILL.
L. REv. 344, 346, 347 (1947).
7. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2677 (1949).
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wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office . . .
"fEmployee of the government' includes . . . members of the -military or naval
forces of the United States ... "'
"'Acting within the scope of his office or employment', in the case of a member of
the military or naval forces of the United States, means acting in line of duty."
"The provisions [of the act] . . . shall not apply to ...
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war . . ."'
Thus it is clear that the Act was designed generally to cover claims arising

out of the negligence of servicemen acting in the line of duty except such
claims as came about through combatant activities in wartime.

The statute

is, however, silent as to the extent to which such persons may be plaintiffs in
tort suits against the Government; at least it contains ,noexpress directions in
that regard.
III. CLAIMS BY THIRD PARTIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
ARISING THROUGH ACTIVITIES OF SERVICEMEN

A. When is a Serviceman an "Employee of the government"?
Since the United States is only responsible for the activities of such
military personnel as are employees of the Federal Government, it becomes
important to ascertain the meaning of that statutory phrase. This question
arose in Mackay v. United States;12 there plaintiff's automobile collided

with a United States Government vehicle bearing an army registration number and driven by a member of the Maine National Guard. At the time of
the collision the truck was being returned from Maine to the supply base
of the Connecticut National Guard, having been borrowed by the Maine
National Guard for use during a forest fire emergency. The district court
found that, since the truck driver was "not in the active service of the United
States," he was not an employee, and accordingly
judgment to the Government.13

it

granted summary

This holding was in accord with an earlier

8. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (2) (b) (1949). Such intentional torts as assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit and interference with contract rights, are expressly excluded
from the coverage of the Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1949).
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 (1949).
10. Ibid. Also important, of course, is -28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1949), which states:
"The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to
tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive
damages."
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (1949). A judgment obtained against the United States
under the Tort Claims Act is made a bar to an action against the Government employee.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2676 (1949).
12. 88 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1949).
13. Id. at 698.
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decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which had reached a
similar result in respect to an accident involving an automobile owned by
the United States Public Health Service and furnished to a local board of
health.14 It would appear, therefore, that the federal bench is reluctant to
interpret the phrase "employee of the government" broadly and is not inclined to extend its meaning to doubtful situations. The problem is not
completely resolved, however, and can be expected to recur in other contexts,
as, for example, in connection with torts committed by active, inactive, organized and volunteer reserve personnel in their various types of training
programs.
B. What Constitutes "acting in line of duty"?
Intimately related to the question of whether a particular serviceman is
an employee of the Government is the problem of whether he is "acting
in the line of duty," for it is only then that liability against the United States
may attach. Here again a trend of strictness in interpretation may be discerned.
In Clemens v. United States,' 5 an army private, for personal reasons,
drove another soldier into St. Paul, Minnesota in an army automobile. This
was a departure from the specified official route for the day and was in
disobedience of orders. A district court found that under Minnesota law'0
the driver was not an agent of the United States, and hence the United
States was not liable to a pedestrian who was struck by the vehicle while
he was operating it. On the other hand, liability was imposed in a case
where a soldier, under the authority of his commanding officer, conveyed
military personnel in a Government-owned vehicle from the military post
to town for their off-duty entertainment. 7 But again the usual strictness
of approach came to the fore in a holding in the Fourth Circuit which
absolved the Government from liability where a Marine Corps officer, traveling home on deferred leave prior to reporting at another base and driving
his own automobile, collided with plaintiff's oncoming car; the officer was
14. Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1948) (applying Kentucky law),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 954 (1949).
15. 88 F. Supp. 971 (D. Minn. 1950) (applying Minnesota law).
16. The statute provided that in the operation of a motor vehicle "by any person
other than the owner, with the consent of .the owner, express or implied, the operator
thereof shall ... be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation
thereof." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1946).
17. Murphey v. United States, 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950), reversing 79 F. Supp.
925 (N.D. Cal. 1948). To the same effect is Hubsch v. United States, 174 F.2d 7
(5th Cir. 1949) (applying Florida law), referred to the District Court for settlemeut,
338 U.S. 440, 70 Sup. Ct. 225, 94 L. Ed. 244 (1949). Cf. United States v. Fotopulos,
180 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1950) (United States liable where driver of army truck was
negligent in line of duty); State Farm Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. United States, 172
F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1949).
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viewed as acting for his own use and benefit and not in the scope of his
employment.' 8
Perhaps the most important case on the question of "line of duty" is
United States v. Campbell.i9 There a woman was standing near a railroad
station when she was negligently knocked down by a sailor who was running
to board a troop train which was slowly moving out of the station. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that the
phrase "line of duty" in the Tort Claims Act was to be given the same
liberal construction which opinions of the Attorney General had given it in
connection with claims of military personnel against the Government in
other situations. It was decided that the phrase must rather be construed to
mean the same as "scope of employment" under the applicable state law.
Because the decision is such a momentous one it is well to examine the exact
language of the holding. The Court stated:
"The whole structure and content of the Federal Tort Claims Act makes it
crystal clear that in enacting it and thus subjecting the Government to suit in tort
the Congress was undertaking with the greatest precision to measure and limit the
liability of the Government, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, in the same
manner and to the same extent as the liability of private persons under that doctrine were measured and limited in the various states....
"The attempt then to wrench the phrase . . . 'acting within the scope of his office
or employment,' out of its context . . . and thus to give it a new and entirely different
meaning, the greatly expanded one attributed to 'in line of duty,' when members of
the armed forces themselves are claimants, is nothing more than an attempt to ...
have the tail wag the dog. Such a construction would be to give to the phrase 'within
the scope of his office or employment' not one consistent meaning throughout the act,
but two inconsistent meanings, one of these applying to acts of all government employees except members of the armed forces, would subject the United Statjs to
liability to third persons for acts of its employees only as and to the same extent that
a person in private employment would be liable under the law of the state where the
accident occurred. The other, applying to acts of military personnel would subject
the Government to fantastic claims of liability having no relation to the doctrine of
respondeat superior . .. ."M

The intermediate appellate tribunal thereupon reversed the judgment which
the district court had granted the plaintiff ;21 the Supreme Court refused
18. United States v. Eleazer, 177 .F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying North
Carolina law), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950). A very similar case is Bach v. United
States, 92 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The same problem arose in Rutherford v.
United States, 73 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Tenn. 1947), aff'd 168 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1948)
(United States not liable for injury inflicted by Navy petty officer while driving his
automobile home from radio station where he had broadcast a naval recruting program).
See also Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N.D. Fla. 1948); cf. Burton v.
United States, 90 F. Supp. 957 (M.D. Ala. 1950) (employee of Veteran's Administration
held to be acting in line of duty while driving vehicle belonging to the Administration).
19. 172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 337 U.S. 957 (1949). Cf. Stewart
v. United States, 186 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940 (military authorities' failure to comply with Illinois statutory requirements for storing explosives
renders United States liable for injuries received by children from explosion of grenade);
and United States v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 171 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1948).
20. 172 F.2d at 503.
21. 75 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1948).
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certiorari, which, while it cannot, of course, be taken as an indication of the
22
highest court's agreement with the reasoning of the decision, may possibly
at least demonstrate that the supreme bench was not so disturbed by the hold23
ing as to see fit to review it.

The Campbell decision was followed in a later case in the same circuit disallowing liability when it appeared that an Air Force cadet left an
army post, got drunk, returned, and without authority took off in an airplane
which later crashed into plaintiff's house.2 4 Thus it appears clear that the
courts are disposed to require a definite showing by a plaintiff that the
serviceman was acting within the scope of his employment and are not
prone to give any different meaning to the phrase "line of duty" than they
25
would give to the employment concept in a suit between private litigants.
C. What Is a "claim arising out of the combatant activities"
of the Services?
As already noted, the statute specifically excludes any liability for claims
arising out of combat activities of the military arm. 26 Perhaps because of the
22. The denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari simply meant that "fewer than
four members of the Court deemed it desirable to review [the] decision of the lower
court as a matter 'of sound judicial discretion.'" Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912, 917, 70 Sup. Ct. 252, 94 L. Ed. 562 (1950).
23. The court of appeals in the Campbell case was most disturbed at the "so-called
liberal, but really radical" construction placed on the "line of duty" phrase in connection
with claims by military personnel against the Government. 172 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir.
1949).
24. King v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
964 (1950) ; cf. D'Anna v. United States, 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950) (res ipsa loquitur
applicable where auxiliary gas tank fell from naval airplane and justified finding of
liability on the part of the United States).
25. A novel case dealing with the extent to which claims may be created against
the United States is Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1950), where it was held that the owner of a secret process for manufacturing an antiaircraft gun who granted the United States an exclusive license to make such gun "for
the United States use" could not maintain a suit under the Tort Claims Act based on
the United States' conduct in furnishing the gun to allied and friendly powers. See
also Fulmer v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Ala. 1949). As to the liability of
the Government for acts of prisoners of war, see Nicholson v. United States, 177 F.2d
768 (5th Cir. 1949).
The interesting problem of when the Government's negligence must take place in
order to create liability has recently been considered in Carnes v. United States, 186
F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1951), a decision which may open up new visitas of liability. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1346 (1949) provides for the district courts to have jurisdiction over
"claims . . .accruing on and after January 1, 1945. . . " The Games case, involving
injuries sustained by a 14-year old boy as the result of an explosion on February 2,
1945 of a device which he had picked up in 1944 in the wreckage of an Army airplane,
held that the claim accrued when the explosion happened and not when the Government's
negligence occurred, and hence was cognizable under the act. Cf. Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. United States, 175 F2d 490 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 899 (1949) ;
Jordan v. United States, 170 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1948); Perry v. United States, 170
F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1948).
As to the right of an insurance company as subrogee to maintain an action under
the Tort Claims Act for the amount paid an insured for destruction of a dwelling due
to negligent operation of a military airplane, see National American Fire Ils. Co. v.
United States, 171 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1948). See also United States v. Aetna Casualty
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relative unambiguity of this phrase the litigation involving its interpretation
has not been particularly extensive. A case worthy of comment, however, is
Johnson v. United States.27 There, -after the termination of hostilities with
Japan, naval cargo ships previously used to supply combat vessels with ammunition at sea were placed in Discovery Bay, State of Washington, to await
consignment to other ports for unloading. Such vessels polluted waters
of the bay by discharging oils and sewage, and damaged plaintiffs who were
owners of a clam farm. It was held that the phrase "combat activities" connoted. the physical violence of war and, activities in connection with
actual hostilities but did not embrace actions, such as the pollution in question, which occurred after the end of the fighting. 28 This decision evinces
a liberality of interpretation which is rather unusual in the face of the apparent
strictness already noted in other areas.
IV.

CLAIMS BY SERVICEMEN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

The other side of the liability coin is the question of under what circumstances a member of the armed forces can sue the United States for
injuries sustained. Thus far we have been considering the creation of liability
on the part of the Government by reason of the actions of servicemen, and
now we take up the converse situation. In this connection two decisions of
the United States Supreme Court are of critical importance.
& Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949) ; Old Colony Ins. Co. v.
United States, 168 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United
States, 167 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948).
26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(j) (1949).
27. 170 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948).
28. See also Troyer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 558 (W.D.. Mo. 1947), appeal
dismissed, 170 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1948); Perucki v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 959
(M.D. Pa. 1948); Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947). The
Skeels case is important for its reasoning, which is particularly pertinent in the light of
the near state of war now existing. There the injury occurred while the army was engaged in target practice with its planes. A piece of pipe fell from either an airplane or a
target, striking deceased who was fishing in a boat in the Gulf of Mexico. It was
held that, even though the United States was at war with Japan at the time, this
was not an injury arising out of the "combatant activities" of the military and thus was
not excluded from coverage under the act.
A somewhat analogous problem of interpretation arises in connection with the
exclusion of coverage under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(k) (1949) of "Any claim arising in a
foreign country." The implications of that phrase are illustrated by a case barring
recovery for accidental death at a Newfoundland air base leased from Great Britain,
United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 70 Sup. Ct. 10, 94 L. Ed. 3 (1949), 19 FoRD L. REv.
228 (1950). See Cobb v. United States, 91 F. Supp. 717 (N.D. Cal. 1950); and
Brewer v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1948), applying the same rule
to the island of Okinawa under United States military domination; Straneri v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1948), reaching a similar result in regard to Belgium while under United States military occupation; and Brunell v. United States, 77
F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), holding an analogous principle applicable to the island
of Saipan when under trusteeship granted by the United Nations. See also Boyce v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D., Iowa 1950) (dealing with "discretionary function" exception of statute in case involving Corps of Engineers of the Army), and
see Note, v'Discretionary Function' Exception uider the Federal Tort Claims Act, 45
ILL. L. Rv. 791 (1951) ; cf. Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D.Md. 1950),
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In the first of these, Brooks v. United States,20 an automobile in which
two servicemen were riding, not in the performance of their duties, was
struck at a highway intersection by an army truck, thereby causing the death
of one and the injury of the other. The circumstances were such that in
the case of persons not members of the armed forces there would have been
a right of action under the Tort Claims Act. It was held by seven justices
of the court ° that the fact that the injured persons were members of the
armed forces did not preclude the maintenance of their action; it was, however, intimated that the damages recoverable should be reduced by the
amount payable to the claimants under servicemen's benefit laws. 3'
32
The latest Supreme Court case in point, Feres v. United States,

involved the situation which was expressly left undecided by the highest
tribunal in the Brooks case-that is, where the serviceman's injury was
sustained as "incident to the service." The Feres case was actually composed
of three decisions from three different circuits. In one case decedent perished
by fire at Pine Camp, New York, while on active duty, and negligence was
alleged in quartering him in unsafe barracks. In the second a towel was
asserted to have been negligently left in plaintiff's abdomen by an army
doctor who had performed an operation upon him. In the third it was
alleged that plaintiff met death while on active duty because of unskillful
treatment by army surgeons. The common theme underlying all three situations was that each serviceman, while on active duty and not on furlough,
sustained injury allegedly due to negligence of others in the armed forces.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Jackson, unanimously concludedm that no recovery could be had in any of the cases. The Court said:
"We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover
for negligence, against either his superior officers or the Government he is
serving. ' 34 It then went on to point out that the relationship between
29. 337 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200 (1949), 10 LA. L. REv. 94. A
trenchant criticism of the circuit court decision in the Brooks case is found in Note, 58
YALE L.J. 615 (1949). See also Blanton, The Federal Tort Claims Act it Action, 53
DIcK. L. RFv. 163, 168-71 (1949) ; Notes, 44 ILL. L. REV. 212, 221 (1949), 27 TEXAS L.
REv.807, 814-816 (1949) ; 35 CORNELL L.Q. 233 (1949) ; 11 LA. L.REV. 125 (1950) ; 48
Micr L. REv. 534 (1950), 28 N.C.L. REV. 137 (1949); 28 NE. L. REV. 614 (1949).
30. Justices Frankfurter and Douglas dissented. They wrote no opinions but indicated their dissents were substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of
Judge Dobie below. 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948). See also Samson v. United States,
79 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (action maintainable by Army private injured on
War Department bus); and Alansky v. Northwest Airlines, 77 F. Supp. 556 (D.
Mont. 1948) (action maintainable by officer killed in crash of airplane owned by the
United States; crash occurred while he was being transported prior to discharge),
31. Such benefit laws include 38 U.S.C.A. § 701 (Supp. 1950), and 10 U.S.C.A. §
903 (Supp. 1950). See also Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950)
(soldier's wife injured by negligence at army hospital) ; cf. Denny v. United States,
171 F2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
32. 340 U.S. 135, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 134 (1950).
33. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the result.
34. 340 U.S. at 141 (1950). Cf. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390, 13 L. Ed. 1036
(1851) ; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 135, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616).
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members of the armed forces and the Government was "distinctively federal
in character"35 and in no wise the same as any relationship between private
litigants; the court also took pains to show that the compensation payable
to injured servicemen under various benefit laws 36 was not niggardly. The
Brooks case was distinguished on the basis that there the injury did not arise
out of or in the course of military duty.37
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This brief study of some of the problems which have arisen in respect
to servicemen during the' first five and a half years of the administration of
the Tort Claims Act does not, of course, purport to be exhaustive. The fire
has been selective rather than broadside, and the effort has been only to
sketch in broad sweep some of the questions which have confronted the
courts. The Act is still in its infancy, and it would be premature to state
anything more than tentative conclusions as to what has occurred. Thus
this discussion seeks to pose problems rather than to offer solutions.
With this caveat in mind a few observations may be made. It appears
that the courts have been quite strict in their interpretation of the Act both as
to claims arising against the United States by virtue of the activities of servicemen and as to claims pressed by military personnel against the Government.
With respect to claims against the Government, litigants seem to be experiencing considerable difficulty in establishing that the claim arose out of
the serviceman's employment. The phrase "in the line of duty" has been
regarded as synonomous with the common law concept of agency 38 and unless

the situation is such as would create a common law cause -of action between
private litigants it will not create a liability against the United States.
What fact situation will make the serviceman an agent acting on behalf of
the Government must be determined by reference to the applicable state
35. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 67 Sup. Ct. 1604, 91 L. Ed.
2067 (1947).
36. See, for example, the provisions of the statutes mentioned at note 31 supra.
Compare the somewhat different reasoning in Wham v. United States, 180 F.2d 38
(D.C. Cir. 1950) (member of District of Columbia police force not precluded from
recovering under Tort Claims Act because he received benefits from police and firemen's relief fund), and United States v. Wade, 170 F.2d 298 (1st Cir. 1948).
37. A result similar to the Feres case was reached by the New York Court of
.,Appeals in Goldstein v. New York, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939) with reference
to a soldier in the state militia. Some have argued for an extension of the Brooks
case, however. See, e.g., Note, Recovery for "Service-Incident" Injuries under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 50 COL. L. Rxv. 827, 833 (1950).
38. Some of the commentators had supposed that the phrase "line of duty" would
receive a broader interpretation than the common law notion of "scope of employment". See, e.g., Street, Tort Liability of the State: The Federal Tort Claims Act and
the Crown Proceedings Act, 47 MIcH. L. REV. 341, 355 (1949) and Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 540 (1947). It would now appear that such is not
to be the case.
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law of negligence and agency, and the courts will not strain to bring a claim
within the Act.
When a serviceman asserts a claim for negligence it must appear that
the injury suffered did not result as an incident of his military duties. If
his injury is traceable to such duties he will be precluded from recovery
under the Act and will be relegated to the remedies given by the various
veterans' benefit statutes.
In summary it can be said that the courts are moving forward slowly
and thoughtfully in this new and uncharted area. No novel or startling
principles are being put forward; rather is reliance being placed on established rules of the common law. In doubtful cases recovery against the
Government is being disallowed. The panorama of liability is not yet clear
but it is evolving, and in the next few years we can expect many decisions
which gradually will demarcate the metes and bounds of this field. In essence
what we are witnessing is an illustration of the familiar and changeless
common law growth pattern pressing forward and "making haste slowly"
in a new area of the law.
This relatively slow movement of the courts has evoked the ire of
some; it has been said, for example, that "Frequent reiteration of the muchcriticized maxim that 'statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity must be
strictly construed' serves to rationalize the courts' refusal to accept Congress' repudiation of immunity at its broad face value."39 As this review
of the cases has demonstrated, undeniably there is some basis for this criticism.
The lower courts particularly have evinced a tendency towards restricting
the base of liability in areas where broadening would perhaps have been more
desirable. Yet we should not be too quick to judge nor too harsh in our
judgment. "A vast new field of litigation in the Federal Courts has been
opened by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Few cases have been decided
under the Act, and each factual situation presents novel and difficult problems as to the construction and application of the Act."' 40 It cannot be expected that miracles of enlightened construction will happen in every case,
and allowances for errors must be made as the courts carefully thread their
way through the language of the statute.
In conclusion it may be hoped that courts will remember that this Act
is a new chapter in the law of torts, a chapter which represents a recognition
that it is a desirable and, necessary thing in our modern complex economy to
spread the economic loss from accidents, which would be catastrophic to the
39. Note, 58 YALE L.J. 615 (1949).
40. Chief Judge Watson in Perucki v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 959, 960 (M.D. Pa.

1948).
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individual, over the community as a whole. Liberality in interpretation
should be the aim. A good guide is the statement by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court in United States v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.41 "In
argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of Appeals, the
Government relied upon the doctrine that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. We think that the congressional attitude
in passing the Tort Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement . . . 'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves

hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its
rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.'"
41. 338 U.S. 366, 383, 70 Sup. Ct. 207, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949).
Uncle Sam-A Tort-Feasor,29 ORE. L. REv. 245 (1950).

See also Tooze,

